טריגרים לחסימת אימות

import { HttpsError } from "firebase-functions/v2/identity";

throw new HttpsError('invalid-argument');

raise https_fn.HttpsError(
    code=https_fn.FunctionsErrorCode.INVALID_ARGUMENT)

throw new HttpsError('permission-denied', 'Unauthorized request origin!');

raise https_fn.HttpsError(
    code=https_fn.FunctionsErrorCode.PERMISSION_DENIED,
    message="Unauthorized request origin!"
)

export const beforecreated = beforeUserCreated((event) => {
  const user = event.data;
  // (If the user is authenticating within a tenant context, the tenant ID can be determined from
  // user.tenantId or from event.resource, e.g. 'projects/project-id/tenant/tenant-id-1')

  // Only users of a specific domain can sign up.
  if (!user?.email?.includes('@acme.com')) {
    throw new HttpsError('invalid-argument', "Unauthorized email");
  }
});

# Block account creation with any non-acme email address.
@identity_fn.before_user_created()
def validatenewuser(
    event: identity_fn.AuthBlockingEvent,
) -> identity_fn.BeforeCreateResponse | None:
    # User data passed in from the CloudEvent.
    user = event.data

    # Only users of a specific domain can sign up.
    if user.email is None or "@acme.com" not in user.email:
        # Return None so that Firebase Auth rejects the account creation.
        raise https_fn.HttpsError(
            code=https_fn.FunctionsErrorCode.INVALID_ARGUMENT,
            message="Unauthorized email",
        )
main.py

throw new HttpsError('invalid-argument', "Unauthorized email");

# Only users of a specific domain can sign up.
if user.email is None or "@acme.com" not in user.email:
    # Return None so that Firebase Auth rejects the account creation.
    raise https_fn.HttpsError(
        code=https_fn.FunctionsErrorCode.INVALID_ARGUMENT,
        message="Unauthorized email",
    )
main.py

import { getAuth, createUserWithEmailAndPassword } from 'firebase/auth';

// Blocking functions can also be triggered in a multi-tenant context before user creation.
// firebase.auth().tenantId = 'tenant-id-1';
const auth = getAuth();
try {
  const result = await createUserWithEmailAndPassword(auth)
  const idTokenResult = await result.user.getIdTokenResult();
  console.log(idTokenResult.claim.admin);
} catch(error) {
  if (error.code !== 'auth/internal-error' && error.message.indexOf('Cloud Function') !== -1) {
      // Display error.
    } else {
      // Registration succeeds.
    }
}

export const beforecreated = beforeUserCreated((event) => {
  return {
    // If no display name is provided, set it to "Guest".
    displayName: event.data.displayName || 'Guest'
  };
});

@identity_fn.before_user_created()
def setdefaultname(
    event: identity_fn.AuthBlockingEvent,
) -> identity_fn.BeforeCreateResponse | None:
    return identity_fn.BeforeCreateResponse(
        # If no display name is provided, set it to "Guest".
        display_name=event.data.display_name if event.data.display_name is not None else "Guest"
    )
main.py

export const beforecreated = beforeUserCreated((event) => {
  const user = event.data;
  if (!user?.email?.includes('@example.com')) {
    throw new HttpsError(
      'invalid-argument', 'Unauthorized email');
  }
});

 @identity_fn.before_user_created()
   def validatenewuser(
       event: identity_fn.AuthBlockingEvent,
   ) -> identity_fn.BeforeCreateResponse | None:
       # User data passed in from the CloudEvent.
       user = event.data

       # Only users of a specific domain can sign up.
       if user.email is None or "@example.com" not in user.email:
           # Return None so that Firebase Auth rejects the account creation.
           raise https_fn.HttpsError(
               code=https_fn.FunctionsErrorCode.INVALID_ARGUMENT,
               message="Unauthorized email",
           )

export const beforecreated = beforeUserCreated((event) => {
  const user = event.data;
  if (user.email && !user.emailVerified) {
    throw new HttpsError(
      'invalid-argument', 'Unverified email');
  }
});

@identity_fn.before_user_created()
def requireverified(
    event: identity_fn.AuthBlockingEvent,
) -> identity_fn.BeforeCreateResponse | None:
    if event.data.email is not None and not event.data.email_verified:
        raise https_fn.HttpsError(
            code=https_fn.FunctionsErrorCode.INVALID_ARGUMENT,
            message="You must register using a trusted provider.",
        )
main.py

export const beforecreated = beforeUserCreated((event) => {
  const user = event.data;
  if (user.email && !user.emailVerified && event.eventType.includes(':facebook.com')) {
    return {
      emailVerified: true,
    };
  }
});

@identity_fn.before_user_created()
def markverified(
    event: identity_fn.AuthBlockingEvent,
) -> identity_fn.BeforeCreateResponse | None:
    if event.data.email is not None and "@facebook.com" in event.data.email:
        return identity_fn.BeforeSignInResponse(email_verified=True)
main.py

export const beforesignedin = beforeUserSignedIn((event) => {
  if (isSuspiciousIpAddress(event.ipAddress)) {
    throw new HttpsError(
      'permission-denied', 'Unauthorized access!');
  }
});

@identity_fn.before_user_signed_in()
def ipban(
    event: identity_fn.AuthBlockingEvent,
) -> identity_fn.BeforeSignInResponse | None:
    if is_suspicious(event.ip_address):
        raise https_fn.HttpsError(
            code=https_fn.FunctionsErrorCode.PERMISSION_DENIED, message="IP banned."
        )
main.py

export const beforecreated = beforeUserCreated((event) => {
    if (event.credential &&
        event.credential.claims &&
        event.credential.providerId === "saml.my-provider-id") {
        return {
            // Employee ID does not change so save in persistent claims (stored in
            // Auth DB).
            customClaims: {
                eid: event.credential.claims.employeeid,
            },
        };
    }
});

export const beforesignin = beforeUserSignedIn((event) => {
    if (event.credential &&
        event.credential.claims &&
        event.credential.providerId === "saml.my-provider-id") {
        return {
            // Copy role and groups to token claims. These will not be persisted.
            sessionClaims: {
                role: event.credential.claims.role,
                groups: event.credential.claims.groups,
            },
        };
    }
});

@identity_fn.before_user_created()
def setemployeeid(
    event: identity_fn.AuthBlockingEvent,
) -> identity_fn.BeforeCreateResponse | None:
    if (
        event.credential is not None
        and event.credential.claims is not None
        and event.credential.provider_id == "saml.my-provider-id"
    ):
        return identity_fn.BeforeCreateResponse(
            custom_claims={"eid": event.credential.claims["employeeid"]}
        )


@identity_fn.before_user_signed_in()
def copyclaimstosession(
    event: identity_fn.AuthBlockingEvent,
) -> identity_fn.BeforeSignInResponse | None:
    if (
        event.credential is not None
        and event.credential.claims is not None
        and event.credential.provider_id == "saml.my-provider-id"
    ):
        return identity_fn.BeforeSignInResponse(
            session_claims={
                "role": event.credential.claims["role"],
                "groups": event.credential.claims["groups"],
            }
        )
main.py

export const beforecreated = beforeUserCreated((event) => {
  const user = event.data;
  if (user.photoURL) {
    return isPhotoAppropriate(user.photoURL)
      .then((status) => {
        if (!status) {
          // Sanitize inappropriate photos by replacing them with guest photos.
          // Users could also be blocked from sign-up, disabled, etc.
          return {
            photoURL: PLACEHOLDER_GUEST_PHOTO_URL,
          };
        }
      });
});

@identity_fn.before_user_created()
def sanitizeprofilephoto(
    event: identity_fn.AuthBlockingEvent,
) -> identity_fn.BeforeCreateResponse | None:
    if event.data.photo_url is not None:
        score = analyze_photo_with_ml(event.data.photo_url)
        if score > THRESHOLD:
            return identity_fn.BeforeCreateResponse(photo_url=PLACEHOLDER_URL)
main.py

const {OAuth2Client} = require('google-auth-library');
const {google} = require('googleapis');
// ...
// Initialize Google OAuth client.
const keys = require('./oauth2.keys.json');
const oAuth2Client = new OAuth2Client(
  keys.web.client_id,
  keys.web.client_secret
);

export const beforecreated = beforeUserCreated((event) => {
  const user = event.data;
  if (event.credential &&
      event.credential.providerId === 'google.com') {
    // Store the refresh token for later offline use.
    // These will only be returned if refresh tokens credentials are included
    // (enabled by Cloud console).
    return saveUserRefreshToken(
        user.uid,
        event.credential.refreshToken,
        'google.com'
      )
      .then(() => {
        // Blocking the function is not required. The function can resolve while
        // this operation continues to run in the background.
        return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
          // For this operation to succeed, the appropriate OAuth scope should be requested
          // on sign in with Google, client-side. In this case:
          // https://www.googleapis.com/auth/calendar
          // You can check granted_scopes from within:
          // event.additionalUserInfo.profile.granted_scopes (space joined list of scopes).

          // Set access token/refresh token.
          oAuth2Client.setCredentials({
            access_token: event.credential.accessToken,
            refresh_token: event.credential.refreshToken,
          });
          const calendar = google.calendar('v3');
          // Setup Onboarding event on user's calendar.
          const event = {/** ... */};
          calendar.events.insert({
            auth: oauth2client,
            calendarId: 'primary',
            resource: event,
          }, (err, event) => {
            // Do not fail. This is a best effort approach.
            resolve();
          });
      });
    })
  }
});

@identity_fn.before_user_created()
def savegoogletoken(
    event: identity_fn.AuthBlockingEvent,
) -> identity_fn.BeforeCreateResponse | None:
    """During sign-up, save the Google OAuth2 access token and queue up a task
    to schedule an onboarding session on the user's Google Calendar.

    You will only get an access token if you enabled it in your project's blocking
    functions settings in the Firebase console:

    https://console.firebase.google.com/project/_/authentication/settings
    """
    if event.credential is not None and event.credential.provider_id == "google.com":
        print(f"Signed in with {event.credential.provider_id}. Saving access token.")

        firestore_client: google.cloud.firestore.Client = firestore.client()
        doc_ref = firestore_client.collection("user_info").document(event.data.uid)
        doc_ref.set({"calendar_access_token": event.credential.access_token}, merge=True)

        tasks_client = google.cloud.tasks_v2.CloudTasksClient()
        task_queue = tasks_client.queue_path(
            params.PROJECT_ID.value, options.SupportedRegion.US_CENTRAL1.value, "scheduleonboarding"
        )
        target_uri = get_function_url("scheduleonboarding")
        calendar_task = google.cloud.tasks_v2.Task(
            http_request={
                "http_method": google.cloud.tasks_v2.HttpMethod.POST,
                "url": target_uri,
                "headers": {"Content-type": "application/json"},
                "body": json.dumps({"data": {"uid": event.data.uid}}).encode(),
            },
            schedule_time=datetime.now() + timedelta(minutes=1),
        )
        tasks_client.create_task(parent=task_queue, task=calendar_task)
main.py

const { beforeSmsSent } = require("firebase-functions/v2/identity");
exports.beforesmssentv2 = beforeSmsSent((event) => {
 if (
   event.smsType === "SIGN_IN_OR_SIGN_UP" &&
   event.additionalUserInfo.phoneNumber.includes('+91')
 ) {
   return {
     recaptchaActionOverride: "ALLOW",
   };
 }

 // Allow users to sign in with recaptcha score greater than 0.5
 if (event.additionalUserInfo.recaptchaScore > 0.5) {
   return {
     recaptchaActionOverride: 'ALLOW',
   };
 }

 // Block all others.
 return  {
   recaptchaActionOverride: 'BLOCK',
 }
});